domains / security / auth-bypass-hunt / hunt-auth-bypass
The two copies share the same core hunting methodology (Crown Jewel Targets, Attack Surface Signals, and the 8-step Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology), but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy includes a detailed Legacy-Protocol Matrix for probing legacy endpoints (WordPress XMLRPC, REST, SharePoint, etc.) that is absent from the sickn33 copy. The sickn33 copy includes a mandatory authorization confirmation gate and a specific SSH certificate-authority trust forgery technique that are absent from the uphiago copy. Crowning one would hide these real alternatives.
| Repository | Path |
|---|---|
| uphiago/recon-skills | redteam/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
| sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
| Role | Repository | Path |
|---|---|---|
| peer | uphiago/recon-skills | redteam/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
| peer | sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
| adapter | sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | plugins/agentic-awesome-skills/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
| adapter | sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md |
--- name: hunt-auth-bypass description: Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential, SAML signature stripping, SAML domain enforcement bypass, partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse, WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO, JWT alg-confusion, JWT signature-validation skip, and token-audience confusion. version: 1.1.0 license: MIT category: security risk: offensive tags: [auth, bypass, hunt, redteam] --- > **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY** > This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. > You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. > Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited. > **Mandatory confirmation gate** > Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target: > 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource. > 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope. > 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect. > 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation. > > Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab. ## Crown Jewel Targets Auth bypass is consistently one of the highest-paying vulnerability classes in bug bounty because it directly violates the most fundamental security control. High-value targets include: - **SSO/SAML implementations** at enterprise SaaS companies (Slack, Okta, OneLogin integrations) — payouts regularly in the $5K–$25K+ range - **Admin panels and partner/internal portals** — subdomain-separated admin surfaces like `partners.shopify.com`, `admin.company.com` - **Third-party auth plugin integrations** — WordPress plugins (OneLogin, WP-SAML-Auth), Drupal SSO modules, any CMS with pluggable auth - **XMLRPC endpoints** on WordPress — often forgotten, bypasses standard WP auth flows entirely - **OAuth callback flows** — state parameter mishandling, redirect_uri mismatches - **API authentication layers** — especially where auth was bolted on after the fact **Asset priority:** Targets with federated identity (SAML, OAuth, OIDC) connected to large user populations. Partner/reseller portals are particularly juicy because they often have elevated permissions and less security scrutiny than the main product. ### SSH certificate-authority trust forgery (Git-hosting / enterprise platforms) When an org or instance registers an SSH certificate authority, cert `principals` may not be bound server-side to the requesting identity — a member can mint a cert asserting another user's principal and authenticate as them (e.g. modify another user's resource given only its URL). Add SSH-CA trust to the auth-surface list on Git-hosting targets; niche/platform-specific. ## Attack Surface Signals **URL patterns to hunt:** ``` /xmlrpc.php /wp-login.php /saml/ /sso/ /auth/saml/callback /oauth/callback /partners.* /admin.* /?wc-api= /api/v*/auth /login?redirect= /accounts/login ``` **Response headers signaling SSO:** ``` X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (common on SSO portals) Set-Cookie: SAMLResponse= Location: https://idp.company.com/saml WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="partners" ``` **JS patterns indicating federated auth:** ```javascript // Look for in page source samlRequest RelayState SAMLResponse onelogin shibboleth okta passport.js authenticate ``` **Tech stack signals:** - WordPress + any SSO plugin → check XMLRPC separately - Shopify Partner API exposure → cross-tenant privilege escalation risk - Any app advertising "SSO enabled" or "Login with [Enterprise IdP]" - Separate subdomains for admin/partner that share session cookies with main domain - Applications using `SimpleSAMLphp`, `ruby-saml`, `python-saml` **Burp passive scan triggers:** - `SAMLResponse` in any POST body - `openid_connect` or `id_token` in responses - Cookie domains set to `.company.com` (wildcard) ## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology 1. **Map all authentication entry points** - spider the target for every login surface: main login, admin login, API login, partner portal, mobile API endpoints - check `robots.txt`, JS files, and the wayback machine for forgotten endpoints like `/xmlrpc.php` 2. **Identify the auth mechanism per entry point** - Is it forms-based, SAML, OAuth, API key, session token? - For WordPress: always probe `/xmlrpc.php` even if the main login is SSO-protected 3. **Test XMLRPC independently of SSO** - If site uses SSO (e.g., OneLogin), manually POST to `/xmlrpc.php` - XMLRPC uses WordPress-native credentials, not SSO — test with `system.listMethods` first, then `wp.getUsersBlogs` 4. **Enumerate SAML implementation** - Capture a valid SAMLResponse via Burp - Decode the Base64 payload, inspect the XML - Test signature stripping, comment injection, and XML wrapping attacks - Test if SP validates the signature at all (send unsigned assertion) 5. **Test cross-portal session/token reuse** - Log into `partners.shopify.com` type portals - Attempt to use the issued token/cookie against the main admin portal - Look for shared cookie domains, shared JWT secrets, or API tokens that work across contexts 6. **Fuzz auth parameters** - Null/empty passwords, `password[]=array`, SQL in username field - Try `admin`/`admin`, `test`/`test` on staging subdomains - Modify `role`, `is_admin`, `user_type` in JWTs (none algorithm, weak secret) 7. **Check redirect and state parameters** - Does removing `state` from OAuth break anything? - Can you change `redirect_uri` to an open redirect target? - Does the `RelayState` in SAML get validated? 8. **Verify impact by escalating privileges** - Don't stop at login — prove you can access admin functions, other users' data, or sensitive configuration - Screenshot the highest-privilege action you can perform ## Legacy-Protocol Matrix (Probe These First on Any Custom-Branded Login) When a target has a custom, branded login UI (e.g. `customlogin.aspx`, `/auth/signin`, `/account/login`), **always probe the platform's legacy protocol endpoints with native credentials** in parallel. These endpoints frequently outlive the custom UI's protections and accept native credentials with NO rate limit, NO MFA challenge, NO CAPTCHA, NO anti-automation. This is the WordPress XMLRPC pattern generalised across CMS / portal / framework stacks. | Target tech | Legacy endpoint(s) to probe | Native-cred bypass surface | |---|---|---| | **WordPress** | `/xmlrpc.php` (`system.listMethods`, `wp.getUsersBlogs`, `system.multicall`) | Native WP user/pass; bypasses SSO, MFA, IP-allow rules on `/wp-login.php` | | **WordPress (REST)** | `/?rest_route=/wp/v2/users`, `/wp-json/wp/v2/users` | User enumeration anonymously even when login page is hardened | | **SharePoint (any version)** | `/_vti_bin/owssvr.dll`, `/_layouts/15/user.aspx` | Native AD/NTLM credentials; bypasses modern auth flows |