domains / families / security / hunt-mfa-bypass

hunt-mfa-bypass

combined

Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO.

When to use

• You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
• You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

When not to use

• Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
• Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
• Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Skill page

Conflict

The two copies overlap heavily on the core MFA bypass patterns (skip MFA step, OTP replay, response manipulation, race condition, brute force), but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy adds OAuth device code flow MFA bypass, backup code brute force with ffuf, and 'remember this device' trust escalation. The sickn33 copy adds a mandatory authorization confirmation gate, a prefix oracle / incremental validation technique, and explicit guidance to stay in one session during prefix sweeps. Crowning one copy would hide these real alternatives and constraints.