domains / families / security / hunt-llm-ai

hunt-llm-ai

combined

Hunt LLM/AI feature bugs Hunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration viatool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web pages/email the model reads, ASCII smuggling (Unicode Tags block U+E0000-U+E007F, invisible to humans, decoded by the model),tool-use exfiltration (model has fetch/browse tool, attacker injects OOB URL, model exfils chat history/secrets), markdown-image zero-click exfil, system-prompt extraction, IDOR-via-AI (cross-tenant data). Targets: chatbots, RAG, summarizers, agentic copilots, MCPtools. Detection: any LLM-backed endpoint, doc upload triggering AI processing, autonomous agent withtools. Validate: OOB/Collaborator callback for exfil, verbatim-reproducible system-prompt leak (run twice), verifiable cross-tenant leak or RCE. Confabulation is NOT a finding. Use when hunting AI features, chatbots, RAG, agentic syst…

When to use

• You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
• You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

When not to use

• Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
• Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
• Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Skill page

Conflict

The two copies share the same core procedure (False-Positive Gate, direct/indirect injection, OOB exfil proof) but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy includes ASCII smuggling (Unicode Tags block) and markdown-image zero-click exfil with specific payloads, while the sickn33 copy adds a mandatory authorization/confirmation gate and a multimodal/vision-model injection section. Crowning one would hide a real alternative (authorization gate vs. additional attack vectors).