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hunt-http-smuggling

combined

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detectiontools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.

When to use

When not to use

Skill page

Conflict

Both copies share the same core smuggling matrix, CL.TE example, and H2.CL guidance, but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy adds a CL.0 desync section with raw-socket and curl probes, while the sickn33 copy adds a mandatory authorization gate, an Apache mod_proxy_ajp row, and a mass credential harvesting chain. Crowning one would hide these real alternatives.