domains / families / security / hunt-http-smuggling
Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detectiontools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.
Both copies share the same core smuggling matrix, CL.TE example, and H2.CL guidance, but each contains material steps the other lacks. The uphiago copy adds a CL.0 desync section with raw-socket and curl probes, while the sickn33 copy adds a mandatory authorization gate, an Apache mod_proxy_ajp row, and a mass credential harvesting chain. Crowning one would hide these real alternatives.