domains / families / research / game-theory

game-theory

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This skill covers game-theoretic methods in structural econometrics and industrial organization. Use when the user is working with strategic interactions, equilibrium analysis, or game-theoretic structural models — including entry games, conduct testing, auction models with strategic bidding, bargaining, or matching markets. Triggers on "Nash equilibrium", "subgame perfect", "best response", "strategic interaction", "entry game", "conduct testing", "auction", "mechanism design", "matching market", "bargaining", "BNE", "Bayesian Nash", "static game", "dynamic game", "repeated game", "multiple equilibria", "equilibrium selection", "discrete game", "oligopoly", "game-theoretic", "player", "payoff", "strategy", "dominant strategy", "Bresnahan-Reiss", "Ciliberto-Tamer", "partial identification", "set identification", or markup test.

When to use

• Estimating a structural model where agents interact strategically (oligopoly, entry, bargaining, auctions)
• Deriving or computing Nash equilibria, BNE, or subgame perfect equilibria
• Handling the multiple equilibria problem in empirical games
• Testing firm conduct (competitive vs. collusive vs. oligopolistic)
• Estimating entry models, matching models, or bargaining models
• Formalizing an identification argument for a game-theoretic model
• The model is single-agent (use `structural-modeling` skill for dynamic discrete choice, demand estimation)
• The task is standard causal inference without strategic interaction (use `causal-inference` skill)

When not to use

• single-agent models
• standard causal inference without strategic interaction
• well-known IO models with standard estimation code

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